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Abstract My brand of evolutionary economics recog-
nizes, highlights, that modern economies are always in the
process of changing, never fully at rest, with much of the
energy coming from innovation. This perspective obvi-
ously draws a lot from Schumpeter. Continuing innovation,
and the creative destruction that innovation engenders, is
driving the system. There are winners and losers in the
process, but generally the changes can be regarded as
progress. The processes through which economic activity
and performance evolve has a lot in common with evolu-
tion in biology. In particular, at any time the economy is
marked by considerable variety, there are selection forces
winnowing on that variety, but also continuing emergence
of new ways of doing things and often economic actors.
But there also are important differences from biological
evolution. In particular, both innovation and selection are
to a considerable degree purposive activities, often under-
taken on the basis of relatively strong knowledge.
Keywords Bounded rationality  Innovation 
Problem solving  Selection  Understanding
Before reflecting on the kind of theory of human behavior
and cognition needed in my brand of evolutionary eco-
nomics, I need to lay out the empirical and theoretical
orientation of that body of research and writing. I say ‘‘my
brand’’ because there are several different strands of eco-
nomic theorizing that sometimes are called ‘‘evolution-
ary’’; and this essay is focused on the kind of evolutionary
economics that Sidney Winter and I are associated with
(see, e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002). I will contrast
this kind of evolutionary economics with those other
brands later.
The Orientation of Evolutionary Economics
I focus first on the subject matter addressed. My kind of
evolutionary economics starts from the position that mod-
ern economic systems that make extensive use of for-profit
firms competing for customers on relatively open markets
are always in motion, always evolving, driven by the
continuing innovation that this kind of an economic system
induces. We would argue that the cumulatively vast
increases in living standards and productivity experienced
by a significant part of the world’s population are the most
dramatic and beneficial achievement of the competitive,
market-organized economies that began to emerge in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Therefore,
among the most important challenges for economic theory
are to illuminate how this miracle was accomplished, the
factors behind the differences across parts of the world in
the extent to which they have participated in it, and the
determinants of economic growth in the future.
More generally, like Marx and Schumpeter, evolution-
ary economists see innovation as a central aspect of the
competitive process going on in many industries. As a
result of continuing innovation, the economy always is
evolving, always is in the process of transforming itself.
Within industries, some firms rise and some decline.
Totally new industries based on new technologies come
into existence and older ones disappear. The uneven pace
of technological change across product fields and industries
is a principal cause of the major changes in the structure of
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prices, and in the allocation of labor among economic
sectors, that have occurred over the years.
This is a very different view of what is most important
about modern economic systems and how they work, than
that of the standard economic analysis that now dominates
the writings and teaching in academic economics depart-
ments. Within a standard contemporary economics text
(e.g., Taylor 2008), considerable attention is indeed paid to
economic growth, and it is recognized that technological
innovation is the basic driver of growth. However, eco-
nomic growth is treated as basically an ‘‘aggregate’’ phe-
nomenon, measured by increases in real GNP per capita or
per worker hour, with little attention to the major differ-
ences across industries in rates of productivity growth and
other manifestations of uneven technological change.
There is hardly any examination of how technological
progress occurs, or the kind of competition that goes on in
industries where innovation is important. The analysis of
resource allocation and prices assumes an economy in
equilibrium, not one marked by continuing uneven tech-
nological progress. Similar assumptions underlie the anal-
ysis of what competition is all about.
I note that the much more central focus of evolutionary
economics on technical change and economic growth is not
a new thing in economics. This is what Smith’s The Wealth
of Nations [(1776)1937] is mostly about. Smith and the
‘‘classical’’ economists who followed him also were con-
cerned with the determinants of prices and the allocation of
resources. But these subjects generally were treated after
the sources of economic growth had been discussed. Marx
[(1867) 1932] also had economic growth at the center of
his analytic attention, and his analysis of the structure of
industry and of competition was part of his growth theory.
As the nineteenth century progressed, the treatises on
economics paid less and less attention to economic growth,
and focused more and more on market mechanisms and
how they determined prices and the allocation of resources
in an economic equilibrium. Marshall (1948) Principles of
Economics has very little in it on economic progress. When
in 1911 Schumpeter (1934) wrote his The Theory of Eco-
nomic Development, a book that has had an enormous
influence on the development of modern evolutionary
economics, he clearly knew that he was swimming against
the tide.
As I have said, the central focus of modern evolutionary
economists on long-run economic growth certainly does
not mean that we are not interested in what determines the
configuration of prices that one finds in an economy at any
time, or the allocation of resources to meet different kinds
of wants and among different kinds of activities and eco-
nomic sectors. However, like Smith we treat these subjects
as being molded by the dynamics of economic growth. And
like Marx and Schumpeter, we treat both the organization
of industry, and the waves of depression and inflation that
have marked the history of capitalist economic develop-
ment, as integral aspects of the economic growth process,
and not analyzable independently of understanding of what
drives growth.
I note that, while economists of evolutionary persuasion
have in mind a broad reform of economic analysis, to date
our work has tended to cluster in three somewhat over-
lapping areas. One is study of technological change (for a
survey see Dosi and Nelson 2010). A second is theorizing
and associated empirical work on how business firms
actually operate, and what determines their capabilities and
competitive prowess (see Dosi et al. 2000). A third area in
effect combines these two strands. It is concerned with the
dynamics of Schumpeterian competition, and how the
structure of firms and of the industry as a whole tend to co-
evolve with technologies that are employed (Malerba et al.
1999). Recently the scope of research by evolutionary
economists has been expanding, with forays into topics like
consumer behavior, and economic institutions and their
evolution.
While these different arenas and foci call for somewhat
different structures of analysis, in all of them evolutionary
economists highlight the often shifting ground on which
economic agents stand. Some aspects of the environment in
which they are operating may be relatively stable, in which
case they can learn patterns of action, routines that con-
tinue to suffice to meet their objectives. On the other hand,
other aspects of their environment, or the general context in
which they operate, may have shifted in such a way as to
make what they had been doing no longer effective in
meeting their wants. When this is not recognized, past
behaviors may continue, but the results may be unsatis-
factory or worse. When the situation is recognized, the
economic agent faces the challenge of trying to do some-
thing that is effective in a context which is unfamiliar and
imperfectly, perhaps even wrongly, understood. In some
contexts, or areas of action taking, change in the economic
environment is sufficiently slow so that relatively modest
periodic changes in routine suffice. In other contexts sur-
vival of the economic agents may require continuing
innovation, and some luck as well as skill in identifying
new things to be doing.
I want to turn now to another difference between the
orientation of my brand of evolutionary economics and the
general presumptions of my mother discipline that may be
as or more fundamental than differences in how the eco-
nomic system is viewed and the focal subject matter for
study. It is regarding the nature and function of good
‘‘theory.’’
I and my kin are for the most part ‘‘inductivists.’’ Of
course since Hume’s time no serious scholar has been a
simple, pure inductivist. However, some scientists believe
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that theorizing should proceed from paying close attention
to the empirical phenomena being studied, identifying
broad regular patterns, and then trying to develop reasons
for these that also seem consistent with other empirical
evidence. At the other end of the spectrum, many scientists
believe that at least initial theorizing should be free to
make hypotheses that are at some distance from what is
known empirically, and that the business of empirical work
is to calibrate or test theory.
It is fair to say that while the latter is the view of most
economists today, the evolutionary economists I work with
are largely in the former camp. We believe in looking
closely at the phenomena we are studying with a relatively
open mind, and then coming to an explanation for what we
think we see that makes sense, and is consistent with other
things we know empirically. Since for the most part the-
orizing in evolutionary economics involves specifying the
processes that generate the phenomena to be explained, this
is a commitment to ‘‘process realism,’’ in a sense I will
develop later.
In What Sense is Evolutionary Economics
Evolutionary?
I hope I have made clear what my broad brand of evolu-
tionary economics is about, and the view it holds regarding
the kinds of phenomena that theory needs to address, and
some of the characteristics of a good theory. Let me now
try to explicate in what sense the economics I have
described is ‘‘evolutionary.’’
It is evolutionary, first of all, in the sense that its central
focus is on change, and its explanation of why things are
what they are at any particular moment of time involves
centrally analysis of how they got that way. But second, to
narrow the concept of evolution, the mechanism of change
presumed by the theory involves the assumptions that at
any time there exists a variety of versions of whatever it is
that is in the process of changing, that there are mecha-
nisms of selection that winnow systematically on this
variety, favoring some versions and penalizing others, and
that there also are forces at work that renew variety.
In developing our theoretical framework were we
influenced by evolutionary theory in biology? Certainly we
were, to some degree.
But our belief that economic change was an evolution-
ary process came to us largely by induction, by reflecting
on the empirical phenomena we were observing, and the
processes that we thought were generating those phenom-
ena. I note that notions that social, economic, and political
structures ‘‘evolve’’ in some sense long preceded Darwin
and that, in a sense, modern evolutionary economists are
returning to a line of social science theorizing that has been
around for a long time (Hodgson 1993; Nelson 2006). Thus
the common hallmark of the theories articulated in the
eighteenth century by Mandeville on the evolution of the
warship, Smith on the division of labor and economic
organization, and Hume on political institutions, is the
argument that the complex and sophisticated human-made
structures that one can observe at any time were developed
over a long period of time as a result of a series of incre-
mental changes made by agents who at the time had par-
ticular objectives in mind, but who never foresaw what
would be created over the long run from this cumulative
process.
I also note that there are major differences between
evolutionary economics and evolutionary biology regard-
ing the particular mechanisms that are driving the evolu-
tionary process. (For an extended discussion see Nelson
2006). One important difference is that human and orga-
nizational purpose and often sophisticated understanding
play major roles in evolutionary economics. As I will
elaborate later, evolutionary economics, at least our brand,
draws heavily on Herbert Simon’s (1955) concept of
bounded rationality. But while in comparison with more
orthodox economics we emphasize the ‘‘bounded’’ aspects,
we evolutionary economists do not see individual and
organizational economic agents as like fruit flies. They
often think about what they are doing. It is true that many
animals often behave as if they were thinking. However,
humans innovate deliberately. An important part of the
innovation process involves thinking, doing research, cal-
culating, operations going on in the mind.
A second difference is that the survival and continuity of
economic agents is only occasionally at stake in the
selection on economic practices. Sometimes it is, for
example when competition in an industry is very strong.
But often the individuals and organizations involved are
able to change what they are doing so as to avoid duress.
More generally, and connected to the point I made above
about the role of cognition in economic evolution, it is
common for individuals and organizations that are not
under any particular pressure to adopt new ways of doing
things because they have reason to believe that these would
be improvements.
A third important difference is that many modern evo-
lutionary economists, certainly myself included, highlight
the crucial importance in economic evolution of the broad
culture within which economic agents operate. In particu-
lar, while individual economic agents have particular
beliefs and competences of their own, to a considerable
extent how they think and what they are able to do is the
result of their having grown up in, and operating in, a
culture that includes their fellows. And the new things that
individuals learn, or learn to do, become (if with a lag, and
possibly in different form) part of the body of knowledge
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and technique on which their fellows can draw. As a
consequence, the evolution of know-how and knowledge
more generally needs to be understood as a collective
process.
All three of these aspects sharply differentiate the way
economic capabilities evolve from the processes involved
in biological evolution. Let me make the argument con-
crete by considering how evolutionary economists treat
technical change as an evolutionary process (for a survey
see Dosi and Nelson 2010).
In virtually all fields of technology at any time one can
observe a number of different agents investing the time and
resources to try to come up with the design of a product or
process that is better in some way from those currently in
widespread use. These innovations are often in competition
with each other, and with parts of prevailing practice. Some
succeed and some fail. The winners and losers are some-
times determined by the market, sometimes by other
selection mechanisms. And knowledge of what has suc-
ceeded and what has failed, as well as the nature of the
winners and losers, becomes part of the environment for
the next round of competitive efforts.
I note that evolutionary economists are not alone in
adopting an evolutionary perspective on the processes
through which human know-how and knowledge advance.
It is interesting that the proposition that technological
advance should be understood as an evolutionary process
has been put forth by scholars studying the topic coming
from a variety of different disciplines (see, e.g., Vincenti
1990). Today that language and analytic perspective
enables communication and common understanding among
scholars in the interdisciplinary community studying
technological change.
Evolutionary economics treats a wide range of economic
variables, not just technologies, as evolving. These include
scientific knowledge, business organization and practice,
the structure of industries, the allocation of resources in an
economy, the institutions governing economic activity, and
others. Some of the features of technological evolution
carry over to these other arenas, but others do not. Indeed
in my view an important challenge for evolutionary econ-
omists is to identify the differences in the evolutionary
processes at work in these different spheres, as well as the
common elements. However, I do not have space here to
even sketch the differences.
Different Brands of ‘‘Evolutionary’’ Economics
While this paper is about my brand of evolutionary eco-
nomics, there are at least two other bodies of theorizing and
writing about economic phenomena that sometimes have
been called ‘‘evolutionary’’: evolutionary game theory, and
writing that aims to explain aspects of economic behavior
on the basis of aspects of the human biological inheritance.
What is the relationship between my style of evolu-
tionary economics and evolutionary game theory (see, e.g.,
Weibull 1995; Walliser 2012, this issue)? There is some
overlap of subject matter addressed and modes of expla-
nation. Both are concerned with change. Both see the
change process as evolutionary in the sense that it involves
variety and selection. However, the differences between
the two camps strike me as at least as important as the
similarities. As I proposed above, evolutionary economics
is oriented towards a relatively well-defined body of
empirical subject matter, and the ‘‘evolutionary’’ aspects of
the field are invoked because they seem to explain that
subject matter. In contrast, evolutionary game theory is
largely defined by a general body of theory and technique,
and the subject matter addressed is chosen largely because
that body of technique seems applicable to it. And using
the language I employed earlier, theorizing in evolutionary
economics is largely inductive with (in good work within
the tradition) the empirical subject matter addressed usu-
ally described in some detail. On the other hand, in evo-
lutionary game theory, when empirical subject matter is
addressed that subject matter generally is formulated in
quite abstract form.
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in
trying to explain some economic phenomena, particularly
aspects of economic behavior, as having been influenced
significantly by the evolved biological characteristics of
modern humans. This strand of ‘‘evolutionary’’ economic
analysis obviously has close kinship with the parts of
sociobiology concerned with human behavior and society,
and with evolutionary psychology (e.g., Crawford and
Krebs 2002; Gandolfi et al. 2002; Frey and Stutzer 2007). I
would propose that, while there is no essential incompati-
bility between this line of analysis and evolutionary eco-
nomics as I have described the field, they are different
endeavors. To date my brand of evolutionary economics
has not found it necessary, or useful, to invoke the bio-
logical aspects of humankind in our theorizing about
behavior and cognition. But it is possible that a certain
amount of understanding could be gained by exploring this
route.
The Behavior and Cognition of Economic Agents
in Evolutionary Economics
To get to the subject of the workshop, what is the view of
the behavior and cognition of individuals and organizations
contained explicitly or implicitly in our brand of evolu-
tionary economic theory? Like the view on these matters
that increasingly is coming to the fore in cognitive science,
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it is multifaceted (as discussed in Nelson and Nelson 2002;
see also Nelson 2011).
First of all, a considerable portion of behavior is seen as
relatively automatically induced by the context. Habits,
routines, customs, play a major role within our kind of
economic evolutionary theory. Some of these may involve
highly sophisticated patterns of behavior that required
considerable effort and time to learn, but once learned
become more or less automatic. But second, another aspect
of the behavior of economic agents, operative in different
contexts, involves problem solving, exploring alternatives
both physically and in the mind, discovering and inventing
ways to meet a challenge. Third, while for the most part
human and organizational problem solving proceeds in
close interaction with a particular problem, humans also
can step back from the particular action context they are in,
and reflect on matters that might be relevant more gener-
ally. Such reflection generally involves mental models.
Fourth, these mental models, these beliefs that guide
problem solving and efforts at inventing (and which also
often rationalize prevailing ways of doing things) are seen
as, to a considerable extent, drawn from aspects of col-
lective culture. These aspects of collective culture may
include the understandings of different fields of science,
widely held notions about good business practice, and
various ideological views common in the culture.
I think it useful to compare the orientation to theorizing
about human behavior and cognition in evolutionary eco-
nomics with the orientation in what has come to be called
behavioral economics. (For a survey see DellaVigna 2009.)
Both strands of heterodox economics harbor the belief that
standard neoclassical theory is an inadequate theory of
human behavior. Modern behavioral economics, as that
subject has developed to date, has been mostly concerned
with identifying aspects of human behavior, wherever these
may occur, where the basic cannons of rational behavior as
economists have defined that seem especially problematic.
In contrast, in evolutionary economics the focus is on a
particular body of empirical phenomena and the theorizing
about human behavior and cognition is induced by the need
to characterize and explain the actions of the involved
human agents, particularly in the generation of and
response to economic change.
I note also that, to date at least, the view of human
cognition and behavior in behavioral economics has
repressed the broad common cultural influences on indi-
viduals. For that reason the theorizing in evolutionary
economics may have more in common with that in old-
style institutional economics, which highlighted the col-
lective cultural influences on human beliefs and behaviors
(as described in Hodgson 1999).
I now want to make these somewhat general observa-
tions about the treatment of individual and organizational
behavior and cognition in evolutionary economics more
concrete by focusing on two important topics where as I
noted there has been substantial research and theorizing
within the tradition: technological advance, and firm
capabilities and behavior.
It seems clear that the processes involved in techno-
logical advance involve all the aspects of human behavior
and cognition that I listed above. There is, first of all, a
significant amount of routine involved in or connected with
inventive work, particularly if that work is done by a team
of persons employed by a large organization. Records need
to be kept of what was accomplished when, among other
reasons to enable patent applications to be defended, orders
for materials written up and put in the works, meetings
attended, reports given, etc. But the cutting edge of the
work is problem solving. This involves envisaging possible
designs, conceiving ways to test out ideas, reflection on the
factors behind what has succeeded and failed, and deciding
how to proceed from here.
The concept of a ‘‘technological paradigm’’ (Dosi 1982)
has played a major role in theorizing about technological
advance. A technological paradigm is a body of under-
standing, technique, and problem-solving heuristics shared
by professionals in a field. The prevailing paradigm shapes,
constrains, and gives power to efforts to advance a tech-
nology. However, each individual or team aiming to do so
brings to the task some beliefs, understandings, and expe-
riences unique to it.
Let me turn now to firm behavior. From its beginnings,
our brand of evolutionary economics has harbored the goal
of building a theory of the firm that explained the things
firms did that were of interest to economists in a way that
was consistent with what was known about actual decision
processes in firms. Several important empirical studies had
shown that the processes by which firms determined vari-
ables like the prices they charged, orders for the inputs they
used, and R&D expenditures, usually did not involve any
explicit maximizing calculations, but rather often seemed
largely to involve the use of relatively mechanical rules
and routines. (One of the first and most influential of these
studies was by Hall and Hitch 1939.) A significant com-
munity of scholars and a large body of research now has
grown up around a theory of the firm in which it is assumed
that firm behavior is largely determined by the routines it is
using at any time. (Cyert and March 1963 is the original
source of much of this work.) In the standard course of
business operations, established routines are carried out
without much in the way of conscious thinking about what
should be done.
On the other hand, firms are not locked into their pre-
vailing routines, and in many cases their continuing sur-
vival requires that they change what they are doing in
response to changes in their competitive environment, and
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do so in a timely fashion. Another important part of the
evolutionary theory of the firm, as it has developed, is
concerned with what turns on the firm’s mechanisms for
actively deliberating what it should be doing, and the
changes it needs to make in its operating routines, and the
nature and effectiveness of these deliberation processes.
A firm may be able to change particular things it is
doing without any change in its broad orientation or
strategy. On the other hand, strategy making and remaking
also is an important component of the behavioral theory of
the firm, and are activities assumed to involve conscious
deliberation. In contrast with the carrying out of established
routines, and the making of moderate changes in these,
which is going on all the time, established strategies tend to
be subject to significant revision only occasionally. The
change process generally involves discussion among a
small group of top executives. A number of alternatives
may be considered, and then winnowed. Some explicit
research may be involved in the process. However, several
detailed studies (e.g., Leonard-Barton 1992; Tripsis and
Gavetti 2000) have shown convincingly that the alterna-
tives considered and the winnowing process are shaped to a
considerable degree by the past experiences of the partic-
ipants and by the then-fashionable beliefs about what
makes for good business practice.
Not surprisingly a good share of the work of evolu-
tionary economists on the theory of the firm has been
concerned with understanding what is involved when firms
innovate, the nature of the capabilities for timely and
effective innovation that leading firms have, and of what is
involved when lagging firms try to catch up. Again, an
adequate characterization of what is going on in these cases
would seem to require all of the kinds of behavior that I
laid out earlier. And the analyses here clearly blur into the
writings on technological change more generally.
I noted earlier that evolutionary economists are begin-
ning to study consumer behavior. Let me consider now the
kinds of behavior assumed in my article with Davide
Consoli on ‘‘An Evolutionary Theory of Household Con-
sumption Behavior’’ (Nelson and Consoli 2010). The var-
iegated view of individual behavior and cognition that one
sees in the evolutionary perspective on how technology
progresses and on firm behavior shows up again in this
apparently very different context.
Household consumption behavior is seen as to a large
extent a matter of acquired habits and routines. But there
are occasions when conscious decision making, including
some research, is involved, in particular for big-ticket items
like the purchase of a new automobile or the choice of a
college for one’s children. And in both of these cases the
individual consumer or household needs to be understood
as a member of a broader community, and strongly influ-
enced by the culture of that community, which molds their
preferences, their routines, and how they think about
alternative courses of action.
And there are occasions in which households, like firms,
are required to ‘‘innovate.’’ Not surprisingly we evolu-
tionary economists are particularly interested in how con-
sumers respond to new goods and services. Here, they may
have little experience of their own to draw on, and when
the good is first introduced to the market there is no cultural
experience on which to draw. Particularly for new goods
that have capabilities and qualities that established goods
do not have, households have to make judgments as to what
needs the new good might meet, and whether meeting
those needs is worth the price. Some experimentation may
be required before the questions are answered.
After some households adopt a good, notions about what
the good is for enter the culture. And we enter the realm of
diffusion theory.
The Challenge for Cognitive Science
The treatment, or rather the treatments, of human cognition
and behavior in evolutionary economics clearly are very
different from how these subjects are treated in neoclassi-
cal economics. In the first place, evolutionary economics is
committed to trying to ‘‘get the process right.’’ The pre-
sumption is that understanding of how human actions are
generated in particular contexts is an essential part of a
theory that aims to explain or predict what those actions
are. The argument in neoclassical theory that economic
agents behave ‘‘as if’’ they maximized utility, and it does
not matter how they actually arrive at the actions they do, is
not acceptable from this point of view.
Second, in many of the contexts that are of interest to
evolutionary economics there is no way that the economic
agents can have a full understanding of all the actions that
are possible and the consequences of each, nor has there
been sufficient experience for them to arrive at the best
action through trial and error learning. In many contexts it
is clear that a number of economic agents are making
mistakes, in the sense that they are being stimulated to
change what they are doing as the consequences become
clearer, And in these and other contexts it is typical to see
economic agents, who have similar goals and face similar
constraints, doing different things, and getting different
results.
As noted, Herbert Simon’s (1955) conception of
‘‘bounded’’ rationality fits much better the view of human
goal-oriented activity contained in evolutionary economics
than does the full-blown rationality of neoclassical eco-
nomics. The concept does not deny the role of purpose and
reflection in guiding human action, but highlights the limits
of human understanding. The proposition, also argued by
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Simon and his colleagues, that much of goal-oriented
behavior involves the following of established routines
similarly does not deny purpose and intelligence, but rather
highlights both that the actions engaged in today are ones
that seemed to work satisfactorily in the past, and that there
are real costs involved in continuingly rethinking what to
do (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). Both
of these conceptions clearly have had a major influence on
evolutionary economics.
So have developments in cognitive science. Scholars in
cognitive science increasingly are recognizing—high-
lighting may be a better term—that humans get things done
and respond to stimuli in a variety of different ways,
depending on what they are doing and the circumstances.
For a long time the focus of cognitive science was on
human problem solving that required, or appeared to
require, conscious cognition. The artificial intelligence
branch of cognitive science, which was dominant in the
early days of the new field, assumed that the process of
human problem solving involved information processing in
a manner similar to that built into computer programs. But
from the field’s beginnings there have been strong objec-
tions to the ‘‘humans think like computers operate’’ point
of view. (For a brief historical discussion see Nelson and
Nelson 2002.) One position that developed in opposition
argued that ‘‘pattern recognition’’ should be understood as
the central element of human problem solving, and in the
responses of humans to circumstances that occur and
require a response. While these two camps in computer
science still stand mostly at odds, in my view the processes
of inventing and strategizing—important elements of evo-
lutionary economics—often tend to involve both elements.
And the debate in cognitive science has helped me to
recognize this.
There also has emerged within parts of the cognitive
science community recognition, and insistence, that much
of human action taking occurs relatively automatically
(through the implementation of ‘‘routines’’), although the
pattern of action may be the result of considerable learning
from earlier experiences (see, e.g., Hendriks-Jansen 1996;
Hutchins 1996). In some cases this line of argument is
linked to analysis that stresses the importance of pattern
recognition as a trigger for particular action, treating pat-
tern recognition as something humans do often without
much thinking about it. But more generally, the realm of
conscious deliberation, which long had been the focus of
scholars in the field, now is recognized by many as com-
prising an important part of human behavior, but only a
part. Merlin Donald (1991) in particular has stressed the
varied nature of human activity and the cognitive processes
involved.
In view of Herbert Simon’s role in the shaping of cog-
nitive science, it is interesting that at least two of his earlier
conceptions regarding human cognition and behavior are
largely repressed in the field. One is the basic argument
behind the concept of bounded rationality that in many
contexts no amount of thought, calculation, and study can
yield the absolute best solution to a problem. It is not even
clear that a best solution can be defined, except tautologi-
cally. And while it may be helpful in such circumstances to
try to identify earlier problems that were similar in some
way, often there will not be any close match. Yet this is
exactly the context within which many efforts to innovate
proceed. To date cognitive science has not dealt much with
this kind of problem solving.
The second is his recognition that much of human
cognition and action taking takes place as part of a team, as
part of a collaborative effort to do something. While his
1958 book with James March, Organizations, is about
behavior in and of formal organizations, even when formal
organization is not the context, much of human activity
involves doing things with other people. It is clear that in
such contexts such matters as shared language, and shared
understandings of what the goal is and of how to achieve it,
are crucial elements of the human cognition that shapes
behavior. With few exceptions (see, e.g., Donald 1991;
Hutchins 1996) these matters are beyond the scope of
contemporary cognitive science.
More generally, while there is promise in some recent
developments, there still is limited recognition among most
scholars working in the field of cognitive science of the
role that a shared culture plays in molding human behavior
and cognition. When an engineer begins to analyze the
problem of, say, how to improve the fuel efficiency of an
engine, he or she brings to the table not just his or her past
experience in wrestling with problems like this one, but a
good share of the accumulated knowledge of generations of
technologists and scientists that is relevant to the current
problem. Cognitive science presently is largely blind to
this. Ignoring the influences on human cognition and
behavior that come from the culture individuals grow up in
and live in may be legitimate given the way cognitive
science has defined its tasks and goals. But evolutionary
economists cannot ignore this, because what they are
studying is exactly the processes through which important
elements of human culture evolve.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
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